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Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A
Search for Principled Standards
Ralph S. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 19841 appears in
Title 17 of the United States Code, entitled "Copyrights." Yet,
the protection afforded by the Act is not traditional copyright
protection. Though similar to copyright in important respects,2
it is a sui generis scheme.3 A bill supported by the Senate
Committee would have inflicted a score of amendments on the
copyright statute itself in order to protect chips. 4 Fortunately,
the sui generis approach that emerged from the House Com-
mittee prevailed.5 That copyright protection was seriously con-
sidered at all, and the persistence of copyright elements in the
enacted statute, stimulate speculation about the proper scope of
copyright protection.
This Article considers several ways to appraise eligibility
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus, Yale Law School; Visiting
Professor, New York Law School.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984).
2. See Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Apply-
ing the Lessons of Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 497-
98 (1985).
3. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-11, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5750, 5753-60 (All citations to the House Report
are to the star print. United States Code Congressional and Administrative
News contains the initial version of the House Report. The star print cor-
rected typographical errors in the initial version and contains three additional
pages.); 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 18.01 (1985); Samuelson, supra
note 2, at 471; Stern, Determining Liability for Itfringement of Mask Work
Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Ac 70 MINN. L. REV. 271,
273-74 (1985).
4. See S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
May 16, 1984); Samuelson, supra note 2, at 481-84; see also S. 1201, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S5992-93 (daily ed. May 14, 1983); H.R. 1028, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983); H.R. 1007, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
5. See H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984); see also Samuelson, supra note 2, at 484-86 (discussing the
House Committee approach).
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for copyright protection. To set the stage, in Part I it briefly
considers the subject matter of copyright and the five exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners under the present system.
Subject matter and rights serve as a framework in which to dis-
cern areas of inclusion and exclusion from protection-either
through legislative choice, judicial interpretation, or the hard
knocks of widespread infringement. Within this framework,
we will also glimpse how the boundaries of rights have shifted
through time as new technologies and marketing strategies
have developed.
Part II describes three principled approaches to questions
of eligibility. They do not entirely harmonize with each other.
One exalts the rights of the author; it has natural law founda-
tions in the European droit d'auteur. The second is the con-
stitutionally-derived position of the Supreme Court, which
balances the need for incentives to authorship against the pub-
lic's need for ready access to published works. The third is the
economists' view, in which copyright prevents the free distribu-
tion of public goods, and accordingly needs to be closely
constrained.
Among the applications of these principles discussed in
Part II, particular attention is directed to the two major exclu-
sions from copyright that are closely related to the sui generis
treatment of chip masks. One is the sweeping mandate ex-
pressed in section 102(b) of the copyright statute:
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.
6
The Chip Act does not quarrel with this policy at all. The
other exclusion, the long-standing barrier against recognition of
copyright in useful articles, more than anything else made it in-
appropriate to incorporate the desired protection for mask de-
signs into the copyright statute; for a chip mask is indubitably a
useful article.
The Article concludes that the integrity of future copyright
law depends on insuring that changes in the law do not occur at
the expense of distorting the policies underlying copyright.
I. WRITINGS AND RIGHTS
Federal copyright law owes its existence to the copyright-
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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patent clause of the Constitution, which empowers Congress
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 7 Congress
has interpreted the term "writings" generously when fulfilling
its constitutional mandate.8 The first copyright statute, of 1790,
listed maps and charts ahead of books in its short list of pro-
tected "writings."9 In the 1976 thorough revision of copyright
law,10 the constitutional protection of "writings" became a pro-
tection that "subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."'" This language insures that copyright is
receptive to new technologies, provided that fixation and com-
munication are possible. The language, however, does not em-
brace the full possible reach of "writings" because protection
"subsists, in accordance with this title"12-a phrase that invokes
all the limitations and exclusions of the rest of the Act-espe-
cially sections 108 through 118 of chapter 1, Subject Matter and
Scope of Copyright.
In the 1976 statute, two major categories of writings-in
the broad constitutional sense-fail of protection. The first is
right up front in the statute. Following the terse list of in-
cluded categories in section 102(a)13 comes the vigorous and, I
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (the term
"writings" includes "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellec-
tual or aesthetic labor"); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
58 (1884) (photographs are covered by copyright law "so far as they are repre-
sentatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author"); Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(answer sheets designed for use with student achievement and intelligence
tests qualify as writings to the extent they "contain sufficient originality in
their design" because the term "writings ... is intended to be read
expansively").
9. See Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
10. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
12. IdE
13. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
1985]
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will argue undervalued, negative admonition of section 102(b),
already quoted.' 4
The other major denial of copyright protection is more ob-
lique. It is the bar against copyright in useful articles, which
must be pursued through section 113, on the scope of rights in
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,15 back into the defini-
tions section, section 101, which, along with other land-mines
and spring-guns, includes an attempt to define "useful arti-
cle,"'1 6 and, in the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works," fires off an exclusion of "their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects."'1 7  In another fulmination, this over-
burdened definition demands that design features of a useful
object, to be protectable, "can be identified separately from, and
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article."' 8 Thus, to take the most striking example,
fabric designs are copyrightable; you can hang them decora-
tively but uselessly on a wall. 19 On the other hand, a dress de-
sign is not, because the shape and function of a dress make it a
useful object. We will return to these issues.
The present reach of the statute can give guidance whether
additional "writings" should be brought into the statutory
scheme, or whether their inclusion would instead damage copy-
right principles. But that reach is only partly defined by sub-
ject matter. It is equally important to look at the kinds of
rights that the statute grants or qualifies and to ask also
whether the author's rights are respected.
The starting point for this examination is section 106 of the
1976 Copyright Act, which lists the five exclusive rights20
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
14. See supra text accompanying note 6.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1982) (copyright may not cover "useful articles").
16. According to § 101, "[a] 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article
or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
17. Id
18. Id
19. Richard H. Stern, a prominent attorney specializing in intellectual
property law, has pointed out that one also sees Japanese kimonos hung on
walls as decorations; but that does not vitiate the proposition that apparel is
basically "useful." Letter from Richard H. Stern to Ralph S. Brown (Aug. 14,
1985) (copy on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The Constitution refers in the singular to
the "Right" that Congress can grant to authors. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. This constraint, however, has been unheeded by the drafters of copyright
[Vol. 70:579
1985] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
granted to copyright owners. The first of these is the right to
reproduce the work.21 This right, the historical foundation
upon which copyright law rests, afforded authors virtually iron-
clad protection until recently when two new technologies, inex-
pensive photocopying 22  and tape recording, significantly
undermined it. 23
The second exclusive right granted copyright owners under
section 106 is the right "to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work."24 This right appears to be flourishing,
having come a long way since the early days when copyright
protected only against literal copying, and abridgement or
translation was viewed as a useful endeavor needing no permis-
sion from the author.2
statutes who from the beginning have granted rights to authors. For example,
the first American copyright statute conferred "the sole right and liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing and vending," see Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124, and the present statute grants authors five exclusive
rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (1982).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
22. While it is commonly observed that there is a great deal of unauthor-
ized photocopying, the extent of harm to copyright owners is in dispute. See
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(17 U.S.C. 108) 186-231, app. I (1983); Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Ap-
propriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945, 947-49 (1985).
23. See Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispel-
ling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982). Another recent technolog-
ical advance from Japan, a machine capable of copying the contents of a
videotape directly onto a blank tape, has the movie industry understandably
worried. See Valenti, A Film RipoffBy the Japanese, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,1985,
at A23, col. 1. It will soon be possible to rent a videotaped movie or other
copyrighted material from a tape rental outlet and make copies for a fraction
of the established purchase price. It seems unlikely that such copying would
come within the rationale of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417 (1984), that no harm occurs by home taping of broadcast material for
time-shifting. Id. at 451-56. It is doubtful that videotape copying can be effec-
tively policed, and a resurgence of calls on Congress to provide a form of re-
muneration by taxing the recording machines and blank tape can be expected.
See infra note 31. In the meantime, controversy over the proper scope of the
fair use exemption in Sony persists. See Carter, Copyright Protection, the
Right to Privacy, and Signals that Enter the Home, 3 CARDOzO ARTS & EN-
TERTAINMENT L.J. 289, 290-93 (1984); Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of
Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair
Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins
Cases, 28 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 647, 667-81 (1984); Raskind, A Functional Interpreta-
tion of Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 601, 616-19 (1984).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
25. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 9-12 (1967). For
an example of the long reach of the modern right to prepare derivative works,
see Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 721-23 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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More in flux than the right to prepare derivative works is
the third right, "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of own-
ership, or by rental, lease, or lending. ''26 Although the right ap-
pears quite comprehensive, it is limited by the "first sale"
doctrine.27 This doctrine, codified in section 109 of the 1976
Act, holds that the purchaser of a "particular copy" of a copy-
righted work may sell or otherwise transfer that copy without
permission of the copyright owner.28 The doctrine at first
seems simple enough. If you have bought a book, surely you
can freely lend it or sell it, just as you can a car; but you cannot
copy or perform the book. Recent marketing developments, 29
however, have provoked challenges to "first sale." Consider the
rental business for videotapes. Because copyright owners are
powerless to halt rentals after the first sale, the public is able
to rent movies for under five dollars rather than purchase them
for fifty dollars. Movie magnates might have foreseen such a
thwarting of their expectations; instead, they have turned to
Congress in an effort to change the first sale doctrine3S---so far
without success. Similarly, until recently it was possible to rent
a phonorecord from a music rental store and record it on a
26. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
28. The House Report on the bill that became the 1976 Act explained the
first sale doctrine as follows:
Thus, for example, the outright sale of an authorized copy of a
book frees it from any copyright control over its resale price or other
conditions of its future disposition. A library that has acquired own-
ership of a copy is entitled to lend it under any conditions it chooses
to impose. This does not mean that conditions on future disposition of
copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract between their buyer
and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach of
contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by an ac-
tion for infringement of copyright. Under section 202 however, the
owner of the physical copy or phonorecord cannot reproduce or per-
form the copyrighted work publicly without the copyright owner's
consent.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5693. For a capsule summary of the history of the
first sale doctrine, see Goetzl & Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artists Dis-
play Right A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM. J. ART & LAW 15, 25 nn.39 &
46 (1984). For an argument that the 1976 Copyright Act does not provide con-
vincing authority for application of the doctrine to videocassette rentals, see
Colby, The First Sale Doctrine-The Defense That Never Was?, 32 J. CoPy-
RIGHT Soc'Y 77 (1984).
29. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
30. See S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S261 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
1983). This bill would proscribe unauthorized rental, lease, or lending, for
commercial advantage, of copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works.
[Vol. 70:579
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blank tape at a cost far lower than the retail price of the pho-
norecord. This practice differs sharply from simply renting and
returning a movie; an unauthorized copy results. The audio in-
terests, with their pitch that such rentals were no more than a
primrose path to piracy, persuaded Congress to amend section
109; it now makes rental, lease, or lending of phonorecords an
act of civil infringement. 31 This change is doubtlessly defensi-
ble to curb copying; it will require further exploration to estab-
lish a rationale for letting movie makers broaden their
copyright to control rentals that appear to benefit the public.
The fourth exclusive right granted to copyright owners is
the right to "perform the copyrighted work publicly." 32 As
long as the "copyrighted work" is thought of as a musical or
dramatic composition, this performance right is of long stand-
ing.3 3 A much thornier issue arises, however, when performers
of specific renditions of a composition seek the protection of
the copyright laws, asserting a "performance right" in their in-
terpretive rendition of the author's composition.34
The displacement of live musicians by the ubiquitous play-
ing of records over the radio spurred claims for such perform-
31. See Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 450, 98 Stat. 1727
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (Supp. II 1984)). Perhaps this relief is already con-
sidered ineffectual, because of the recent availability of "dubbing decks,"
which easily copy cassettes. See Fantel, Dubbing Decks: Pro and Con, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 23. Legislation has been intro-
duced that would impose taxes on tape decks, dubbing decks, and blank tape,
the proceeds of which would be distributed to copyright owners. A license to
copy would be conferred on users of the taxed equipment. See H.R. 2911, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5227 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982).
33. An author's right to authorize performances of original work has long
been recognized both under the common law, see, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223
U.S. 424, 435-36 (1912), and under federal statutes, see, e.g., Act of Aug. 18,
1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (dramatic performance right); Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch.
4, 29 Stat. 481 (musical public performance right). The § 106(4) performance
right in the current statute is limited, however, by § 110's odd collection of ex-
emptions. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
34. Such performers' rights historically and conceptually have not been
part of American copyright law. In Europe, performers' rights, while not a
part of copyright, are nonetheless recognized as "neighboring rights." See, e.g.,
S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 181-86
(1983). Much learning has been lavished on the location of the boundary be-
tween these neighboring rights, or "droits voisins," and copyright, as well as
on the scope of the protection granted to authors by neighboring rights. See
generally ic. at 176-77 ("Droit voisins" developed as new communication me-
dia rendered the personal rights of "droit d'auteur" impracticable.).
1985]
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ers' rights fifty years ago. 5 These claimants would exact a
licensing fee from broadcasters of the phonorecords who were
already, albeit reluctantly, paying the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers for licenses to broadcast
the recorded songs.36 Although the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in 1937 held that a common law performers' right ex-
ists,37 Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the 1940 case of RCA
Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman3s turned the tide against
judges creating such a right. Twenty years later, the spread of
unauthorized duplications of records and tapes spurred both
state3 9 and federal40 legislation proscribing such "dubbing."
Federal law, however, granted a narrow right, protecting only
against unauthorized duplication. It does not protect against
imitation or simulation of the rendition; and the long-sought
right against unauthorized performance is still withheld. De-
spite the Copyright Office's 1978 recommendation that such
performers' rights be created,41 Congress has yet to agree, and
the listening public continues to enjoy the Top Forty over the
air without having to pay the pipers.
The last and least, in economic importance, of the statutory
rights is the right "to display the copyrighted work publicly."42
New in the 1976 Act, this right does not proscribe much that
would not also be considered copying or performing. Further,
what protection it does provide is limited by the "face-to-face"
teaching exemption in section 110(1) 43 and the first sale doc-
35. See Note, Rights of Performers and Recorders Against Unlicensed Rec-
ord Broadcasts, 49 YALE L.J. 559, 563-64 (1940).
36. See R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 382-83 (4th ed.
1985).
37. See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 439-42,
194 A. 631, 634-38 (1937).
38. 114 F.2d 86, 88-90 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
39. See Persserilo, State Anti-Sound Piracy Laws and A Proposed Model
Statute, 8 PERF. ARTS REv. 1 (1978); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West
1970 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.17-.20 (1984).
40. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, 85 Stat. 391, 391-92
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982)).
41. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,763 (1978). Under this proposal, broadcasters
would pay a compulsory license fee, with the proceeds being shared by record
companies and performers. Id. at 12,766-68.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1982).
43. This section provides that copyright is not infringed by the
performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational in-
stitution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction, un-
less, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the
performance, or the display of individual images, is given by means of
[-Vol. 70:579
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trine discussed earlier."
According to the House Report, the interplay between the
section 106(5) display right and the section 109(b) first sale doc-
trine results in the proscription of "indirect" displays only.
45
Persons who have purchased works without restrictions may
display the works privately or in galleries, but, in view of the
"potentialities of the new communications media," a transmit-
ted display of a visual image of a copyrighted work "from one
place to members of the public located elsewhere" is not al-
lowed.46 The apparent intention is to curb only those displays,
such as televised displays, that would impair the artist's market
for reproductions of the work.
47
Professor Thomas Goetzl and Stuart Sutton challenge this
position in a recent article, boldly suggesting that an artist
should be entitled to a compulsory license fee whenever his or
her work is exhibited publicly in any manner.48 They would
further create a private display right-buying a picture would
not even give the buyer the right to look at it. Perhaps realiz-
ing that such a proposal stands little chance of success, they are
willing to settle instead for a federal "follow-up right," derived
from the French droit de suite and the California Resale Royal-
ties Act.49 The resale royalty is intended to give the artist a
a copy that was not lawfully made under this title [17 U.S.C. § 101 et
seq.], and that the person responsible for the performance knew or
had reason to believe was not lawfully made ....
17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982).
44. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5693.
46. I& at 80, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5694. Note that under
§ 109(b) the exemption extends only to those public displays that are made
"either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time,"
thus proscribing the simultaneous projection of multiple images of the copy-
righted work. Ic-
47. As explained in the Report, the committee's intention was to
preserve the traditional privilege of the owner of a copy to display it
directly, but to place reasonable restrictions on the ability to display it
indirectly in such a way that the copyright owner's market for repro-
duction and distribution of copies would be affected. Unless it consti-
tutes a fair use under section 107, or unless one of the special
provisions of section 110 or Ill is applicable, projection of more than
one image at a time, or transmission of an image to the public over
television or other communication channels, would be an infringe-
ment for the same reasons that reproduction in copies would be.
id-
48. See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 28, at 17-18.
49. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). The California
Act is based on the droit de suite which exists in the copyright laws of France,
1985]
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share in the realized appreciation in value of his or her work.
Goetzl and Sutton would rather characterize the payment as a
license for the buyer to display and view the work of art.
They support this position by analogizing the grant of a fol-
low-up right to the erosion of the first-sale doctrine that has oc-
curred in the phonorecord industry.5° They also invoke the
existence of a public lending right in England and a few other
European countries, 51 which measures readership of books lent
by public libraries and pays a fee to authors from public funds.
The public lending right, however, appears more to resemble
the film makers' so far fruitless claim to a share of videotape
rental proceeds than it does the artists' claims to follow-up
rights from "compensable events."52
While there are conceptual and practical distinctions be-
tween these different types of claims to post-sale rights, they
appear to be functionally similar in that they would all restrict
the use of the copyrighted work. The right to control the use of
a work, although granted to inventors,53 has never been part of
copyright except as performance may be considered "use." -In-
deed, the absence of a "use right" helps justify the relatively
Italy, Germany, and other countries. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at
§ 8.22[A]. Droit de suite can be roughly translated as "the right of an artist to
'follow' or participate in the proceeds realized from the resale of the tangible
embodiment of [the] work." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the ap-
plicability of the doctrine to American copyright law, see generally Price, Gov-
ernment Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit de
Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337-52 (1968); Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Re-
sale Royalty Legislation: "What Hath Art Wrought?," 26 UCLA L. REv. 322,
351-57 (1978).
50. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51. Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 28, at 29 n.54; see Seeman, A Look at the
Public Lending Righ 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 71 (1983). The Euro-
pean public lending right provisions, except West Germany's, however, are in-
dependent of copyright. Cf. id. at 91.
52. Goetzl and Sutton use the term "compensable event" to signify any
event occurring after the initial sale of a copyrighted work to which a right
might be attached. See Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 28, at 16. Thus, under
the provisions of the California resale royalty system, discussed supra note 49
and accompanying text, most sales of a work of fine art would be compensable
events.
In contrast to "compensable events" that may be difficult to realize, recent
legislation in California, Massachusetts, and New York assures visual artists
their right to claim or disclaim authorship of their works and, to a limited ex-
tent, a right against mutilation or destruction of the work. See R. BROwN & R.
DENICOLA, supra note 36, at 591-93. Assertion of the paternity right should be
essentially costless. The integrity right, however, may impose burdens on the
owners of art works.
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
[Vol. 70:579
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casual approach to granting copyright as opposed to the more
searching tests for patentability.5
II. SEARCHING FOR PRINCIPLES
A. THREE APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHT
The preceding survey shows how the subject-matter of
copyright is entwined with the kinds of rights that authors hold
in different kinds of subject-matter. We now carry forward the
search for underlying principles that Congress, or other deci-
sion makers, can bring to bear when they face proposals for
protecting a new form of "writing" or for an expansion of
rights in writings old or new.
One morally principled approach exalts authors. Au-
thors-using the Constitution's word to include writers, com-
posers, artists, and many others-are the bearers and creators
of our culture, both high and popular.5 5 Except for a fortunate
and highly gifted few, they are not richly rewarded. Their
works are easily appropriated by persons who need not com-
pensate them. Further, these works are intellectual creations
that bear the creative and personal stamp of their authors. Ac-
cording to this approach, the author should be able to decide
when and how to publish his or her personal creation, both as a
matter of respect and as a matter of allowing the author to win
material rewards as best she can.-
It is easy for proponents of this "exaltation of authorship"
approach to slip into bathos about the lofty and lonely position
of the author. It is as easy to slip into cynicism, and to observe
that, the way the system is organized, those we idealize as
lonely authors are often in fact the well-paid henchmen of
monster multinational conglomerates that grind out-whatever
the cynic despises. Less formidable entrepreneurs are cur-
rently obtaining copyrights on catalogs, dolls, and plastic flow-
ers, not exactly the stuff of culture high or low.5 7 Cynicism
aside, there is probably a substantial consensus in support of
Justice Reed's concluding affirmation in Mazer v. Stein that
"[s]acrificial days devoted to .. .creative activities deserve re-
54. See R. BRoWN & R. DENICOLA, supra note 36, at 76-80 ("Note on Stan-
dards for Copyrights and Patents").
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
56. See, e.g., S. STEWART, supra note 34, at 3-4.
57. See Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced Commercial Prod-
ucts: A Review of Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REv.
807, 807 (1971).
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wards commensurate with the services rendered."58
Unfortunately, such vague rhetoric does little more than
adorn the stage on which actual choices must be played out. A
measurably more focused statement of the exaltation of author-
ship approach can be found in the views of the former Register
of Copyrights, David Ladd.5 9 Ladd takes strong issue with what
he perceives to be the basic approach taken in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios,6° that is, "allocat[ing] to the
copyright owner only that portion [of compensation], however
determined, which would avoid 'harm.' "61 Believing that such
determination is bound to be arbitrary, Ladd asserts "that the
public is best served by regarding copyright as an instrument of
property operating in a free market economy, '6 2 and he refuses
to "enter into the debate about how much--either by exemp-
tions, limitations, or compulsory licenses-this right and the
value of this right should be compromised."63
This is strong medicine, especially when a second dose is
proffered. Ladd endorses the idea that when an author has cre-
ated something and an entrepreneur has incurred the risk and
expense in bringing the author's work to the public "there
should be compensation for the use of that work based upon
what the public is willing to pay. In other words, reasonable
compensation for every use of the work just as with other prop-
erty, whether it be car rental, lease, or admission to a thea-
ter."64 Note that this bold position, doubtless acclaimed by
copyright owners, seems to call for property rights in "every
use" of a work, held in check only by market forces. In some
cases, Ladd would accept "collective administration" necessi-
tated by transaction costs, 65 for example, when many copyright
owners ask some return from a multitude of users making
home tapes.
For another example, consider again the Goetzl and Sutton
58. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, rehg denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954).
59. See, e.g., Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 421, 427 (1983).
60. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
61. Interview with former Register of Copyrights, David Ladd, 29 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 334, 337. All the quotations from Ladd in
this paragraph and the next are taken from this forceful and wide-ranging
interview.
62. I- at 340.
63. Id.
64. IdH at 337.
65. Id. (collective administration by ASCAP, BMI, or the Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal is necessary).
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proposal to provide an additional source of income for deserv-
ing artists by creating a display right that would survive the
sale of a painting or sculpture.6 The advantage of this scheme
is that the fee would be paid by parties who do not now contrib-
ute to the painting's price, namely by galleries that want to dis-
play the work. This plan would therefore tap a group of free-
riders, which is usually a good idea. But there would be costs.
The transaction costs of administering such a scheme would, as
its authors concede, be high.6 7 Further, the number of exhibi-
tions almost certainly would decline unless the justice of the
artists' claim moves public authorities munificently to appropri-
ate more funds for the galleries. 68 It is questionable whether
active artists as a group would favor such a plan if they knew
that it would decrease the opportunities for displaying their
work.69
Similar objections can be raised to the Goetzl and Sutton
proposal for a federal resale royalty.70 A likely effect of such a
proposal would be to depress initial sale prices. 71 Larger ques-
tions arise regarding the feasibility of calling upon the law to
shift demand curves in the interest of artists who do not have
the market power to get more for their work.72
Exaltation of authorship, whatever its emotional appeal, is
not, in itself, enough to justify extending existing rights, even if
66. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
67. See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 28, at 36 n.78 (scheme is complex).
68. Cf id. at 37 ("[I]mposing rights in public display would increase the
burden on public institutions already faltering under financial strain. .. ").
69. Such a scheme might actually work to the benefit of the artists that
need it least. Many struggling artists might waive their claim to display right,
preferring to gain the exposure and forget the cash.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
71. See Bolch, Damon & Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the Califor-
nia Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689, 699 (1978).
72. Goetzl and Sutton urge their prescriptions eloquently and make a
strong case that conventional copyright does not offer much to artists whose
works have a limited market in reproductions. But their desire to expand the
display right collides with the absence of a market, that is of effective demand.
Other authors, for example composers of popular music that is indeed popular,
can extract payments from broadcasters and record makers because their
works are in demand. Goetzl and Sutton conclude that "[a] private display
right for the visual artist simply provides similar economic advantages where
similar power is lacking." Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 28, at 55. But if this
power is lacking, the law cannot create economic advantages for those whose
works have no market. Public subsidies can, however, fill the gap. In the
Netherlands, the government pays a salary to recognized professional artists,
and consequently there are warehouses full of unsold works. Newman, Artists
in Holland Survive by Selling to the Governmen4 Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1982, at 1,
col. 4.
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it is likely that creating a new property right will in fact shift
resources in the authors' direction. That is the message of the
second principled approach, which stems from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution's copyright clause.
The Supreme Court regularly intones that "[t]he copyright
law . . .makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion. '73 As recently as last year the Court restated its view of
the purpose of the copyright law:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative ac-
tivity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.74
The constitutional approach focuses on copyright as a way
of promoting the general public good,75 an approach mandated
by the copyright-patent clause 76 itself. The copyright-patent
clause is the only one of the enumerated powers of Congress
that is prefaced by a statement of purpose: "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."'77 The clause does not say
"to maximize the returns to authors and inventors." Conced-
edly, Congress is not effectively constrained by the declaration
of purpose.78 But when one considers the solemnity of the
73. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
74. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975),
where the Supreme Court wrote that:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, re-
flects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Crea-
tive work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability
of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativ-
ity for the general public good.
Id, at 156 (footnotes omitted).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77. Id
78. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130
(8th Cir. 1985) ("[P]urposes do not limit Congress's power to legislate in the
field of copyright.") (footnote omitted). But cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.... in
a patent system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress
of... the useful Arts.' This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and
it may not be ignored.") (emphasis in original). Even if the copyright clause
were overstrained, Congress arguably would be able to invoke the commerce
power to regulate copyrights. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 1.09, at 60.
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clause,7 9 the Supreme Court's continuing concern for the public
good, and the deeply rooted understanding that copyright flows
from acts of Congress and not from natural right, one thing
seems clear. When Congress legislates and courts fill in the
blank spaces, 0 both branches need ways to assess and balance
the expected public good and private rewards.
Congress, more overtly than the courts, sometimes does no
more than respond to pressure groups. Congress has created a
number of exemptions from copyright liability, some of which
have been studied, policy-based decisions while others have
been decidedly less principled. A kind of copyright pork-barrel
has existed, with exemptions from liability being granted to fa-
vored constituents. Thus, after having created a public per-
formance right, Congress created a bundle of full and partial
exemptions from liability in section 110, the public performance
pork-barrel. This section exempts hymn singing at religious
'79. Another principle that is inherent in the constitutional clause flows
from the "for limited times" constraint. Professor David Lange expressed it
well.
[C]opyright is an amalgam of property law principles bent to the ser-
vice of a rather simple bargain. A limited term of protection against
copying is granted to an author's original expression in exchange for
the dedication of that expression to the public domain at the end of
the term. The public ordinarily benefits at least twice from this bar-
gain: once, when the original expression is first created, and then
again when the expression is added to the public domain from which
anyone may borrow freely to fashion new works. Although a copy-
right belongs to an author during its term, the ultimate purpose of
this bargain is not to protect authors but rather to enrich the public
domain. The cardinal principle in copyright law, then, is that any de-
cision to extend the law or to recognize new interests ought to be
based on a realistic expectation that one day the public domain will
bear new fruit.
Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983) (statement of David Lange, Pro-
fessor of Law, Duke University), quoted with approval in H.R. REP. No. 781,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5750,
5754.
80. The conventional view that the judicial role is interstitial with respect
to the creation and recognition of rights--as distinguished from their interpre-
tation and application-is challenged by Professor Dan Rosen. See Rosen, A
Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MLAMI L. REV. 769
(1984). Rosen, a follower of Dean Guido Calabresi, see G. CALABREsI, A COM-
MON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), urges that the courts should avoid
obsolescence in the law by "ongoing updating" of both decisional and statutory
law. See Rosen, supra, at 828. As Rosen surveys the Supreme Court's copy-
right decisions, however, more often than not he finds them wanting. His own
vigorous analysis of the cases seems to undermine his thesis.
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services,81 band music at agricultural fairs,8 2 and dances held by
organizations such as the American Legion or the Elks Club.8 3
It would be digressive to explore fully the pork-barrel ex-
emptions, most of which were created simply because the bene-
ficiaries had a lot of votes, were respectable, and did not want
to pay ASCAP.8 4 Such instances are regrettable but not disas-
trous. For other exemptions, a principled basis can be found. A
kind of collective altruism supports the exemption of purely
charitable performances where not even the musicians are
paid.8 5 Educational interests, relying on the value of their call-
ing, pressed hard in the revision process, both for copying privi-
leges, where only minor concessions were made,86 and for
performance exemptions, which are more substantial.8 7
Congress can and does exempt purely private perform-
ances, such as singing in the shower.8 That only a public per-
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (1982). One might question whether such an ex-
emption raises an "establishment of religion" issue under the first amend-
ment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ... ."); cf United Christian Scientists v. Christian
Science Bd. of Directors, 616 F. Supp. 476 (D.D.C. 1985) (Priv. L. No. 92-60, 85
Stat. 857 (1971), which extended copyright on Mary Baker Eddy's Science and
Health until 2046, was an unconstitutional preference to one religion.).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1982).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (added in 1982 by Pub. L. No. 97-366, § 3, 96
Stat. 1759). College fraternities and sororities tried to get into this exemption,
but their parties are exempted only when they are "held solely to raise funds
for a specific charitable purpose." lI&
84. Occasional beneficiaries of pork-barrel exemptions are cut from a dif-
ferent pattern. For example, juke box operators are not always exemplary
members of the community, yet they long enjoyed an "indefensible" exemp-
tion from the mechanical performance right. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch.
320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1946)) (repealed 1976);
2 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.17, at 8-174. The 1976 Act established a com-
pulsory license, see 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982), but at a fee of only $8 a year for
each machine. This fee was subsequently increased to $50 by the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal. See R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, supra note 36, at 414. This
may all be better understood when one realizes that juke box operators are
scattered throughout the country while song writers and publishers tend to be
concentrated in a few metropolitan congressional districts. See id& For a pene-
trating expos6 of the coin-operated entertainment machine business, see Note,
Section 116 of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act Jukebox Operators and Copy-
right Owners Juke it Out Over Royalties, 3 CARDOzo ARTs & ENTERTAINMENT
L.J. 343 (1984).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (1982).
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 504(c)(2)(i) (1982).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982). Note, however, that under § 1(e) of the
1909 Act, only public performances of music for profit were protected, so that
essentially the 1976 Act maintained the status quo.
88. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975).
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formance right is given reflects respect for privacy and the
impracticality of collecting fees for spontaneous song. There is
indeed wide support for exempting forms of home activity that
on their face constitute copying or performance.89 Photocopy-
ing and videotaping off-the-air are the conspicuous ones, though
both are rationalized as fair use, not as an explicit exemption.
If this home use escape can be generalized to mean that all
home copying is exempt, there arguably is a significant "no
right" in the bundle of copyright ownership rights. This rela-
tive disadvantage suffered by owners of rights to easily copied
material raises the question whether such authors should be
able effectively to invoke equality of treatment.
Perceptions of inequality are especially acute with respect
to a right, notably a performance right, that is rather frag-
mented in its application. While the performance rights of
composers and movie makers, as we have just seen, are not un-
limited, performers complain that they have none at all. They
cannot collect royalties on the broadcast repetitions of their
performances; all they get is their one-time share from the
making and sale of the records.
The record makers and composers have broken the bonds
of the first-sale doctrine and can now control leasing, suppos-
edly for the sake of checking illicit copying. This spurs a claim
for equality on the part of owners of copyright in works like
videocassettes, who would like to maximize revenues from the
leasing market-a rather different rationale.
Next, recall the Goetzl and Sutton argument that because
composers can collect for successive public performances of
their works, painters should be able to collect for successive
public displays of their works.9 When they say that it is "doc-
trinally" wrong not to equalize the disparate treatment,9 ' one
must ask whether the composer's right should indeed be
viewed as the norm, or whether it represents an atypical reach
of copyright to control the use of the copyrighted work, justi-
89. In a recent article, Professor Stephen Carter boldly contends that a
constitutional right of privacy bars any attempt to collect royalties for home
taping. See Carter, supra note 23, at 311. He ventures onto even thinner ice by
suggesting that the copier's privacy right would also forbid indirect payments,
such as a tax on tape. Id- at 317. One would have thought that the indirect tax
would avoid any actual invasion, though of course it would raise the price of
home taping by consenting adults. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969).
90. See Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 28, at 35.
91. Id
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fied by the inability of the composer-or dramatist-to earn
sufficient rewards from the sale of copies. Basically, once the
author has disposed of a copy of a work, our system prefers to
let market forces rule the rewards that flow to property, but
the market is hard to reach if there is a tollgate every few
miles. Performance rights, as they are further extended, inter-
pose too many toll collectors.
Invocation of the magic word "market" means that the
time has come to examine the usefulness of the economic ap-
proach to copyright. Economists tell us that intellectual pro-
ductions are a form of public good. That is, their quantity is not
diminished by consumption.9 2 There is as much Hamlet today
as there was when it was first created almost four hundred
years ago. Furthermore, intellectual productions are not read-
ily "appropriable" because they are so easily copied or per-
formed. Therefore, they cannot be monopolized unless the
state steps in and permits authors and publishers to exclude
others from copying or performing. They will demand pay-
ment, and the need to pay means that a smaller quantity will
be consumed. It diminishes consumer welfare to limit con-
sumption of public goods. However, it may be necessary to ac-
cept higher prices and lower consumption in order to induce
authors to write and publishers to publish.9 3 There are of
course other inducements to write--or paint, or compose-such
as prestige, prizes, and patronage. Our society, however, de-
pends only in part on these three lures and so creates copy-
right. Even without subsidies or copyright, there are still
inducements for publishers to publish. It is clear that they can
and do make money by publishing Hamlet.94
The hard part, even for an economist, is to decide just how
much legitimation of exclusive rights in intellectual property is
-needed to induce the optimal flow of writings and of inventions.
Not much has been written on this critical issue and what there
is gives little immediate guidance. One is habitually referred to
92. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1610,
1611 (1982); see also Cirace, supra note 23, at 656-58.
93. See Cirace, supra note 23, at 656-58; cf. Leontief, On Assignment of
Patent Rights on Inventions Made Under Government Research Contracts, 77
HARv. L. REv. 492, 495-96 (1964) (discussing the economic defects of patent
system).
94. Of course, publishers or producers may misjudge the level of demand,
and disseminate "too much" Hamlet, but that is a normal risk of adjusting sup-
ply to demand.
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two common-sense essays by Sir Arnold Plant,9s who among
other distinctions had Professor Ronald Coase as a pupil. Plant
shows considerable sympathy for the views of a Victorian wor-
thy, Sir Louis Mallet, who, in dissent from a royal commission
of 1876-78 on copyright expansion, declared that the first pub-
lisher of a book, by having a head start, can "secure ample re-
muneration both to the author and himself."' His is a voice
from an age that really believed in free markets,97 even to the
point of being skeptical about the need for a patent system.98
An accessible American counterpart to Plant is The Eco-
nomic Rationale of Copyright, by Robert Hurt and Robert
Schuchman.99 They do pay respectful attention to the philo-
sophical arguments for protecting authorship. As for copy-
right's effect upon economic welfare, here, they sum up, "We
enter an inconclusive area of speculation. However, we can say
that the traditional assumption that copyrights enhance the
general welfare is at least subject to attack on theoretical
grounds; the subject certainly deserves more investigation and
less self-righteous moral defense."1 0° Thus, the lessons from
economics; they are not very helpful in hard cases.
Although lawyer-economists have been short on theory for
copyright, they have been attentive to distinct, identifiable
problems. 10 ' Professor, now Judge, Stephen Breyer was the pi-
oneer, in his 1970 attack on the need for copyright protection,
especially in the textbook business.10 2 The decisions in Wil-
95. See A. PLANT, The Economic Aspect of Copyright in Books, [1934] in
SELECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 57 (1974); A. PLANT, The New
Commerce in Ideas and Intellectual Property, [1953] in SELECTED ECONOMIC
ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 87 (1974).
96. Plant [1934], supra note 95, at 81.
97. A witness before that commission proposed doing away with copyright
to alleviate the problem, as he saw it, that there were "too many books." Id. at
72.
98. See A. PLANT, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inven-
tions, [1934] in SELECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 31 (1974); see also
E. SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITOuT NATIONAL PATENTS, 19-21, 85-87
(1971) (Switzerland did not have a true patent system before 1907, and the
Netherlands repealed its patent law in 1869 and did not revive it until 1912).
99. Hurt & Schucunan, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56:2 AM.
ECON. REV. 421 (1965 Proceedings) (1966).
100. Id. at 439.
101. An exceptional recent contribution by an economist that combines
theory with empirical inquiry is Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Ap-
propriability: Photocopying of Journals, supra note 22, which argues that
publishers can indirectly appropriate revenue from users by price discrimina-
tion against libraries).
102. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright. A Study in Copyright of
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liams & Wilkins Co. v. United States0 3 and Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios0 4 have proved to be fertile
soil for legal-economic commentary on photocopying and home
videotaping. 0 5 In these and other areas where the pliability of
the fair use concept has given almost free rein to judicial and
academic manipulations, a few concepts drawn from economic
analysis have entered the discussion.
The first is that of "market failure." As Professor Wendy
Gordon explains, market failure occurs when a "desired trans-
fer of resource use is unlikely to take place spontaneously, or
where special circumstances such as market flaws impair the
market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how re-
sources should be allocated.'u °6 In such cases, she argues, fair
use may permit copying or performance without compensa-
tion.107 Similarly, Congress may decide not to create or extend
an exclusive right because of evidence-or intuition-that an
efficient market for the right cannot be maintained and that an
attempt to simulate an efficient market through a regulated
compulsory licensing scheme would be unworkable as well. It
may consequently do nothing. Congress may conversely decide,
it will appear, that a particular market is successful without
copyright protection for its product. 0 8 Thus the terms "market
failure" and "market success" describe different avenues to the
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 305-06
(1970). Compare Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1100,
1115-17 (1971) (rejecting Breyer's argument that purchasing organizations,
such as school boards and universities, may insure adequate compensation to
authorized publishers) with Breyer, Copyright A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REv.
75, 83 (1972).
103. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (medical library photocopying), affld by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
104. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home videotaping).
105. For commentary on these decisions, see Cirace, supra note 23; Gold-
stein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods, 21 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
204 (1974); Gordon, supra note 92; Perlman & Rhinelander, Williams & Wil-
kins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process,
1975 Sup. CT. REV. 355; Raskind, supra note 23.
106. Gordon, supra note 92, at 1615. Professor Gordon advocates market
failure as one of three criteria that the defendant in a copyright infringement
action should have to establish to be able to claim the defense of fair use, the
other criteria being that transfer of the use to the defendant in the particular
case would be "socially desirable" and that an award of fair use to the defend-
ant "would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copy-
right owner." Id. at 1614. For a general discussion of several factors that may
lead to market failure, see id at 1627-35.
107. See id. at 1627-45.
108. See infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
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same outcome in that in each instance economic efficiency con-
cerns suggest that an exclusive right not be extended.
Another economic concept that is sometimes relevant
when discussing proposed changes in the copyright system is
that of "externalities." An externality can be defined as a di-
vergence between social and private cost that occurs "when
some activity of party A imposes a cost or confers a benefit on
party B for which party A is not charged or compensated by (or
through) the price system."'10 9 In a recent fair use study, Pro-
fessor John Cirace addresses the argument that home videotap-
ing of broadcast movies imposes losses on movie makers that
should be internalized by the industries benefiting from the
home taping process, namely the makers of the videotape re-
corders and blank tapes." 0 After examining the economic ar-
guments that favor imposing a tax on video recorders and blank
109. Cirace, supra note 23, at 673; see D. DEWEY, MICROECONOMICS 221-22
(1975); A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 184-85 (4th ed. 1932). As ex-
plained in Cirace, supra note 23,
[p]ollution is a common example [of an externality]. If a steel factory,
A, pollutes the air and streams with byproducts of steel production,
many B's suffer damage because of the reduction in air and water
quality. It is often not feasible to compensate these individuals be-
cause of: (1) The transaction costs involved in dealing with large
groups of persons, most of whom suffer small individual damage; (2)
the problem of proving causation (e.g., which factory caused damage
to which individuals); and (3) the problem of determining the extent
to which individuals have suffered damage. The cost of damage,
which is not considered in the market for steel, is said to be external
to that market or an "externality."
IML at 673 (footnotes omitted).
110. See Cirace, supra note 23, at 678-81. Cirace discusses the different ap-
proaches taken to externalities by Pigou and Coase, with Pigou advocating a
system of taxes and subsidies to compensate for the externality and Coase pro-
posing a market solution. I& Compare A. PiGou, supra note 109, at 192 (gov-
ernment intervention through a system of taxes and subsidies can eliminate
divergence between private and social costs) with Coase, The Problem of Social
Cos 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 39-42 (1960) (tax and subsidy system results in misal-
location of resources). Cirace generally adheres to Coase's views, and, when
discussing the Betamax case, noted that
According to the theory of consumption externalities, the argu-
ment against eliminating the externality by placing a per unit tax on
it, the proceeds of which would be paid to those suffering the exter-
nality, is that it may alter the allocation of resources from what would
have been optimal before the tax (i e., overstimulate the production of
feature films and other audiovisual materials) and may overcompen-
sate those suffering the externality. In the context of the plaintiffs'
current opportunities for engaging in price discrimination, which
probably both expands output and results in significant income redis-
tribution effects in favor of the plaintiffs because of their ability to ap-
propriate consumer surplus, the argument against such a per unit tax
on home video records and blank tapes is further strengthened; one
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tape and distributing the proceeds to the movie makers, Cirace,
a follower of Ronald Coase, remains skeptical regarding the
need for intervention. He further thinks that a tax to cure a
Betamax-type consumption externality "may overcompensate
[copyright owners] for the harm suffered and may overstimu-
late production of their works."'1'
Congress should be alert to the spillover into other sectors
that may occur when it creates or shifts property rights just as
it should be aware of the problems of fine tuning a tax in-
tended to compensate copyright owners for external losses.
Yet, though economics can sharpen analysis of a claim for pro-
tection, it does not provide a magic incantation. Thus, the eco-
nomic approach to copyright eligibility, like the exaltation of
authorship" 2 and the constitutional" 3 approaches discussed
earlier, should be viewed as but one of several ways to ap-
proach a search for principled standards." 4
B. CONSTRAINTS SPECIAL TO COPYRIGHT
Whichever general approach or combination of approaches
is taken, there are established limits to copyright eligibility in
our system that must be heeded. The sweeping protection for
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression""u 5 is constricted in two significant respects: the
should caution against even further stimulation of output and even
greater compensation that would result from such a tax.
Cirace, supra note 23, at 680-81 (footnote omitted) (discussing Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
111. Cirace, supra note 23, at 681.
112. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
114. Judge, then Professor, Frank Easterbrook, in Foreword. The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984), measures the work of
the Supreme Court by its fidelity to an ex ante rather than ex post analysis of
questions to be decided, especially in recognizing consequences at the margin-
the effect on the consumption of other entertainment goods, for example, if
the cost of home taping is increased. Affirming the public good characteristics
of information, at the same time he emphasizes the necessity to provide incen-
tives to creators. He nevertheless admires the result reached in Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Easterbrook observes that
the Court "treated the dispute as a conflict between creation and use" and did
not follow "the simplistic ex ante analysis of concluding that the creator of in-
formation is entitled to the highest possible value. It held that Congress may
adjust the entitlements prospectively." Easterbrook, supra, at 28. Economic
concepts are also helpfully considered in Denicola, Institutional Publicity
Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62
N.C.L. REV. 603, 633-36 (1984).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
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separation of idea from copyrightable expression and the avoid-
ance of protection for useful objects. The 1976 Act reiterates
that copyright may not "extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery.""16
This catalog of proscriptions, the 1976 House Report notes, was
intended in part to prevent any extension of copyright in com-
puter programs to the processes or methods embodied in the
program." 7 The broader purpose, the Report continued, was to
"restate ... that the basic dichotomy between expression and
idea remains unchanged.""18 This dichotomy explains the easy
cases fairly well; for example, the idea that all persons are cre-
ated equal cannot be copyrighted. The distinction between idea
and expression begins to bite, however, when it bars things
such as the process that a computer program effects. Such a
process, if invefitive enough, and if it includes physical or chem-
ical activity, may be patentable;" 9 but patentable programs are
scarce. 20 It is thus not surprising that computerized processes
would be pushed toward copyright because any time the ardu-
ous achievement of a short-lived patent can be turned into the
painless acquisition of a seventy-five year copyright, a line will
form to try it, and an academic cheering section can even be
mustered.
When the process or system approaches pure copyright in
that it is wholly verbal or pictorial, like the mysterious account-
ing system denied copyright protection in the bedrock decision
of Baker v. Selden,121 criticism of copyright denial becomes
more pointed. Perhaps because the rule in Baker v. Selden has
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
117. See H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
118. Id
119. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (a 5-4 decision holding that
a computer-controlled process for curing synthetic rubber was patentable).
The Court there concluded:
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or ap-
plies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as
a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a dif-
ferent state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of [35
U.S.C.] § 101.
Idi at 192.
120. See T. HARRIS, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTEC-
TION 129 (1985); Samuelson, CONTU Revisited- The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 663, 756-60.
121. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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been used to deny protection for things like business forms, 22
where one might suppose that more was going on than the sim-
ple denial of protection to ideas, the line between expression
and what is expressed is a bit smudged.123
Still, the idea, system, and process proscription of section
102(b) is, I would argue, the most powerful category of ineligi-
bility for copyright. Of course Congress could create property
rights in purportedly new ways of managing a business, or run-
ning a school, or commanding an army that would be of great
pecuniary value. Fortunately, however, potential value does
not automatically give rise to new rights. The preservation of
some public goods is staunchly viewed as in the public good.
Justice Brandeis said it best: "The general rule of law is, that
the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascer-
tained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary com-
munication to others, free as the air to common use.' ' 2 4 In
homelier terms, you can have copyright protection for your
book about better ways to manage a business, but anyone who
reads, the book can freely use the ideas in it. 25 This is the way
things have been, and there is no reason to believe that the con-
sequence has been a shortage of ideas about managing busi-
nesses. There may be a shortage of practical ideas or of able
managers, but that is another matter. The idea, system, and
process proscription in the Copyright Act is therefore princi-
pled and functional in that it leaves the "noblest of human pro-
ductions" free and unregulated without decreasing the quality
or quantity of those productions.
The treatment of designs of useful objects presents a much
more confusing set of issues. While there is, I believe, a solid
consensus within capitalist economies that copyright is inappro-
priate for ideas and methods, there is a lot of variation in the
application of rules about copyright for industrial design. 126 In
122. See, e.g., M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137 (6th
Cir. 1973). For criticism of the result in cases like M.M. Business Forms, see
Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyrigh 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y. 560, 584 (1982); Olson, The Legal Protection of Printed Systems, 81 W.
VA. L. REV. 45 (1979).
123. For a criticism of the rule of Baker v. Selden, see 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 3, § 2.18[C], at 2-200 to -201 (1985).
124. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
125. This is not to say that authors are rewarded only by royalties on their
books. Persuasive and alert authors can gain remuneration through high-
priced consultations and seminars.
126. See Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976, 31 J.
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the United States, the underlying policy is not much in
doubt,127 though its application is not always easy.
At bottom, there does seem to be a preference for main-
taining a clear distinction between "easy" copyright and "hard"
patent. We do have an ornamental design patent system in
which eligibility is measured by the strict standards of patent
plus an additional requirement of ornamentality. 28 The design
patent system is spotted with attempts to pass off something
that does not qualify for a mechanical patent as an ornamental
design.129
The courts are equally vigilant not to allow unfair competi-
tion and copyright to become havens for failed mechanical and
design patent applications. This watchful position can be ex-
plored by examining leading cases that involved lighting fixture
design. In the companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif-
fel Co.130 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,131 Stif-
fel and Day-Brite attempted, unsuccessfully, to validate
mechanical or design patents for their respective pole lamps
and fluorescent "egg-crate" creations. 132 Thwarted in their in-
fringement claims, they sought injunctive relief under state un-
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 267 (1984); Reichman, Design Protection in-Domestic and
Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act
of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143. The definitions section, § 101, states that picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works
shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but
not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design
of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The term "useful article" is then defined as "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information." 1d.
127. "The prohibition against copyright in useful articles is a fundamental
principle of our copyright laws, adhered to for the nearly 200 years of their
existence." H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5750, 5757.
128. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1982).
129. For cases rejecting design patents in functional objects, see, e.g., Barof-
sky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968) (cabinet with hinged
doors); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (tweezers); see also
Patent and Trademark Office Study of Court Determinations of Patent
Validitity/Invalidity, 1973-1977, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No.
455, D-1, D-2. (Nov. 22, 1979) (68% of the challenged design patents were held
invalid).
130. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
131. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
132. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
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fair competition laws. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
their claims on preemption grounds, with Justice Black reason-
ing in Sears that "[jiust as a State cannot encroach upon the
federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law,
such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a
kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws. '133 Later, in the 1978 case of Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,134
the D.C. Circuit upheld the Register of Copyrights's refusal to
copyright a trim modern design for a lighting fixture because
applicable Copyright Office regulations precluded registration
of the design of a utilitarian article "when all of the design ele-
ments ... are directly related to the useful functions of the ar-
ticle.'1 35 This decision was criticized, chiefly because the
controlling regulation was thought to be hostile to the modern
design principle that form should follow function. 13
The Sears, Compco, and Esquire decisions exemplify the
necessity of maintaining boundaries if copyright--and patent-
are to fulfill their purposes. These boundaries-between copy-
right and patent, between expression and utilitarian function,
and, more fundamentally, between protection and nonprotec-
tion-stand for several policy concerns. The patent/copyright
boundary reflects the distinction in purpose between encourag-
ing technological innovation and stimulating creative expres-
sion. Similarly, the boundary between ornamental design and
useful object reflects the policy determination that a seventy-
five year monopoly on a useful object would frustrate the pol-
icy that seventeen years is long enough for patent protection.
The fundamental boundary between protection and nonprotec-
tion exists because protection is hostile to competition. As a
general rule, competition makes markets efficient. If, however,
it appears that a wholly competitive regime discourages invest-
ment in new models and designs, the system creates limited
monopolies of one kind or another to encourage investment in
innovation. This is the constitutional approach at work: the
protection granted by copyright should be no more extensive
than necessary to stimulate the degree of creativity desired. To
133. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
134. 591 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
135. Joint Appendix at 28, Esquire, quoted in Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798; see
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (revoked 43 FED. REG. 966 (1978)).
136. See Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Ap-
proch to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 737-38 (1983)
("The only justification for the whimsical approach espoused in Esquire is the
desire for a levee to hold back the flood.").
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determine that degree of creativity is no easy task. It requires a
legislative judgment informed by empirical inquiry. Two exam-
ples from the wide world of useful article design show that lit-
tle hard data can be brought to bear.
Before 1954, it seemed clear that neither fabric designs nor
apparel designs could qualify for copyright. 137 In that year,
however, Mazer v. SteinL38 opened the door for protection of
fabric designs as works of art, but the Copyright Office regula-
tions following Mazer, now part of the statute,139 left apparel
design unprotected. The design of a dress, it is thought, cannot
be separated from the useful function of the dress to cover or
uncover the wearer.
We have now had thirty years of fabric design protection.
We have not had any before-and-after studies, at least none
presented in a public forum, to tell us whether the industry is
healthier and more creative. The contrasting effects on dress
designers' creativity of the lack of copyright protection for ap-
parel designs are similarly unknown. Dress designers have
been seeking design protection for most of the century, all in
vain. 40 Yet they struggle on, plagued by instant knock-offs of
their successes by price-cutting competitors. Lower prices ben-
efit the consumer, whose range of choice is constrained only by
the decrees of fashion, not by those of courts enforcing
copyright.141
Another example of a useful article denied copyright pro-
tection brings this discussion back to chip masks. Designers of
printers' typefaces attempted to bring them into copyright dur-
ing the revision process that led to the 1976 Copyright Act. 42
Although typefaces were, and are, eligible for design patent,
they can nowadays be both created and copied so easily by com-
137. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 226-28 (1st ed.
1960).
138. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
140. See B. RINGER, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION (Copyright Of-
fice 1955); Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 79
(1967).
141. In England, dress designs are protectable, as are the designs of many
other useful objects, including automobile replacement parts. See Cornish,
Protecting the Appearance of Products: A British Experiment, in CONGRESS OF
THE AEGEAN SEA 297 (Association Litt~raire et Artistique Internationale,
1983); cf. Lester, Recent Developments in the Copyright Sphere in the United
Kingdom, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 530, 541-42 (1983). Comparative studies on
the economic effects of these measures would be most welcome.
142. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 167 (3d ed. 1978).
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puterized photographic processes that the industry sought the
"easier" protection of copyright. 143 The House Committee,
however, refused to act. As one committee member put it:
I don't see any reason why the letter A can't be a work of art and per-
mit some ingenuity in its design, but the difference is that we commu-
nicate ideas through letters and that the whole theory of the
Constitutional protection is to enhance communication of those ideas,
and I just am a little skittish about giving somebody a lock upon the
vehicle through which the ideas are communicated.
144
So also, computer chips are "vehicle[s] through which...
ideas are communicated.' 145 Nonetheless, by enacting the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,146 Congress did
provide chip masks with copyright-like protection. 47 One can
suggest three main reasons why chip designers were successful
where typeface designers were not. First, the semiconductor
chip industry is a large one, able to exert a great deal of pres-
sure on Congress. Second, its advocates made a convincing
demonstration of probable injury to this industry, with the ad-
ded hook that the Japanese would be inflicting it. Finally, the
timely shift to the sui generis statute with its limited protection
mollified grave concerns. To use the whole sweep of copyright
to protect these purely utilitarian objects would have done vio-
lence to copyright principles.
This final reason assumes that "copyright principles" in-
deed exist, even if they do not lead directly to firm rules of leg-
islation or decision. Ready solutions do not emerge because
each claim for copyright protection has to be examined in a rich
context, now to be restated in conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The most important element in the search for principled
standards of copyright eligibility is the copyright-patent clause
143. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2, 1018-19 (state-
ment of Joseph Gastel, attorney, International Typeface Corp.) (1976).
144. Id. at 1036 (statement of Rep. Wiggins). The 1978 case of Eltra Corp.
v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978), upheld the Register of Copyrights's po-
sition that typeface designs are not copyrightable.
145. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., part 2, 1036 (1976).
146. Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-
914 (Supp. II 1984)).
147. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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of the Constitution. This clause admonishes that the purpose of
copyright is to promote the progress of knowledge. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its understanding of
the policy that flows from the Constitution: the primary public
interest lies in increasing and spreading knowledge, not in re-
wards to authors and publishers.
This position, which reasonably can be called the constitu-
tional approach, stands between two others. One, stemming
from the exaltation of authorship, and most developed in Euro-
pean droit d'auteur theory with its lofty structure of moral
right, goes hard after material rights, too. It favors enlarging
the panoply of property, and letting authors and publishers get
everything they can from it. The other approach, that of main-
line economics, also admires authorship and creativity-but as
public goods which should not be constrained by ownership, ex-
cept where a right to seek a reward is a necessary stimulus to
authorship. Economics casts a cold eye on property rights in in-
tellectual property; economists realize that copyright is a mo-
nopoly device that raises prices and reduces consumptioi, but
they concede that such rights, when well delineated, may make
some markets more effective.
The law maker can profit from both these positions, op-
posed though they are. Droit d'auteur theory gives authors an
advantage. They need one because they are so often confronted
by giant users with more monopoly power than the copyright
system gives the author. On the other hand, the rhetoric of
rights can be cooled off by the cold bath of economic analysis.
Especially valuable is the economist's skill in pursuing the hid-
den implications of a shift of resources.
The legislature and the courts have already created in
copyright an elaborate bundle of rights and of limitations on
those rights. Caution is called for in altering or extending
these rights. When major technological changes like photo-
copying or videotaping occur, immediate adjustments may not
be necessary. Sometimes new technology opens up new mar-
kets. It is not automatic that authors should immediately ap-
propriate those markets, because authors did not take the risk
of developing the new technology. As Judge Hough noted
years ago in the context of claims to movie rights, authors may
be trying to appropriate "an unearned increment conferred...
by the ingenuity of many inventors and mechanicians."'148
148. Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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On the other hand, unharnessed new technologies may de-
stroy old markets, as movies did most of live theater. Drama-
tists, for example, until they got rights in movies made from
their works, may have had less incentive to create plays. In our
time, movie makers may be threatened by their own enterprise
in releasing their works on videotapes. The mere existence of
such a threat does not necessarily mean that movie makers
should be given new rights to control the use of works they
have sold.
Before the system responds to sometimes frenetic claims
for new rights there are counsels for equality of treatment that
should be heeded. Equality, however, obtains among those who
are recognizable as equals. There are vast differences in the
types of authorship gathered into copyright, as well as in mar-
keting strategies, new technologies, and public demand for dif-
fering modes of expression. Equality is not only hard to
measure, but it also may not be totally desirable.
Of equal importance is the desirability of maintaining in-
ternal consistency in copyright. As Dean L. Ray Patterson ob-
served, in testimony calling for the sui generis approach to the
chip mask amendments, "[w]hile consistency for its own sake is
a virtue of small consequence, consistent principles for a body
of law are essential for integrity in the interpretation and ad-
ministration of that law.' '149
To retain this essential internal consistency, copyright
must remain a body of law with fairly definite limits. Copy-
right has expanded to accommodate any number of changes in
the ways that human communications are created and trans-
mitted. It is a successful way of recognizing rights in expressive
people, freeing them from dependence on the bounty of a
feared ruler or a capricious patron. Congress has limited au-
thors' rights, however, so that the use to which readers put
writings is not tyrannized. It is significant that the most com-
prehensive limit on copyright is called fair use. In another di-
rection, exclusive rights are limited so as to leave free the ideas
and systems that a copyrighted work discloses. They are in the
public domain.
In still another direction, our law tries to keep copyright
149. Copyright Protection for Semiconductor Chips: Hearings on H.. 1028
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1983)
(statement of L. Ray Patterson, Professor of Law, Emory University School of
Law).
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clear of the world of industry and useful articles. Copyright,
made easy in order to provide a capacious shelter for works of
enlightenment and diversion, can be too easily bent to evade
the limits on the system of industrial patents or extend monop-
olies that have no support in any system.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 is, as Pat-
terson has aptly labelled it, a venture into "industrial copy-
right."'15 As such, it has constraints, such as short duration,
that distinguish it from copyright. This sui generis experiment
would arouse discomfort if it were the progenitor of a clutter of
little one-of-a-kinds. On the other hand, it may become a
model for a benign Third World between copyright and pat-
ent-a result that would provide an appropriate degree of pro-
tection without sacrificing the doctrinal consistency that is
indispensable to a principled approach to these areas.15 '
150. Id. at 52.
151. President Reagan has recently indicated that he believes federal copy-
right law should be amended to better protect "'firmware,' hardwired logic,
software that interacts intimately with hardware." See Administration State-
ment on International Trade Policy, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,327
(Sept. 23, 1985). "Firmware" does not fit in copyright. Its protection may well
seek the sui generis mode.
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